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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Defendant, William E. Pitcher, Jr., submits the 
following as issues to be reviewed by the Court: 
1) May the Plaintiff properly rely on his version of 
the facts rather than considering all the facts in a light 
most favorable to the verdict, when claiming the trial court 
committed error? 
2) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in not 
allowing Plaintiff to raise the defense of laches in his 
closing argument, when the defense had not been raised prior 
to closing arguments and no facts were in evidence to 
support the defense? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff, R.R. Sather, filed his Complaint 
seeking an accounting and a Writ of Replevin. The Complaint 
was dated August 10, 1981. (R. 5) After Plaintiff had filed 
his Second Amended Complaint and venue had been transferred 
to Uintah County, Utah, Defendant filed his Answer and 
Counterclaim. (R. 44) The Counterclaim sought damages for 
breach of contract and for Plaintiff's abuse of process for 
having two pre-judgment Writs of Replevin issued contrary to 
the law. The trial date was continued several times because 
of Plaintiff's failure to comply with discovery requests. 
(R. 71, 80, 89, 91, 100) Trial was finally held on 
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September 16, 1985. The Court found in favor of Defendant, 
William E. Pitcher on his Counterclaim, emd awarded him 
judgment in the amount of $10,696.88, plus costs. 
Plaintiff, R.R. Sather, and Defendant, William E. 
Pitcher, Jr., entered into a partnership as of January 1, 
1972, to conduct a television and electronic repair service. 
Their agreement was set forth in a typewritten document with 
handwritten additions. (Addendum - Exhibit 2) The 
agreement required the Plaintiff to furnish a shop, 
necessary equipment to operate the business, inventory and a 
service truck. (Par. 1 and 4, Exhibit 2) Mr. Pitcher was 
to devote his full time and effort to the business and to 
operate the business in a good and workmanlike manner. 
(Par. 2, Exhibit 2) The parties agreed that after certain 
business expenses were paid, that the profits or losses 
would be divided equally. Mr. Sather also agreed to pay for 
repair and service work and for parts and materials 
furnished to Satherfs Jewelry, another business owned by the 
Plaintiff. (Exhibit 2, par. 5) 
The partnership lasted from January 1, 1972, through 
December 31, 1978. During that time period, Mr. Pitcher 
devoted his full time and effort to the business. (T. 128) 
He received so little income from the business that he was 
not required to file personal income tax returns for that 
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time period. (T. 59, 188) Plaintiff failed to live up to 
his obligations under the Contract. Originally he provided 
some test equipment for the business, having a value of 
approximately $1,250.00, (T. 19) and some shop space in a 
basement in which to conduct the business. The basement was 
not adequate and Mr. Sather refused to provide a suitable 
shop. (T. 31) Mr. Pitcher moved the business in December, 
1972, to a building which he owned. (T. 31, 110, 124) Mr. 
Sather also refused to provide any more equipment, inventory 
or even a service truck for the business. (T. 48, 58, 125) 
Mr. Pitcher, therefore, was required to obtain all of those 
items using funds generated by the partnership. (T. 58) 
During the time period the partnership operated, it 
incurred a total loss of $9,888.08. (T. 56, Exhibit 5) Most 
of that loss occurred in 1977 and 1978. The Plaintiff 
refused to pay for his share of the loss even though he 
deducted the entire losses from his taxes on his personal 
income tax returns. (T. 56, 144 Exhibit 28) When Plaintiff 
refused to pay his share of the losses, Defendant was 
required to pay the entire sum. 
In 1978, Mr. Pitcher came to the realization that he 
was being taken advantage of and that the Plaintiff had no 
intention of complying with the terms of their agreement. 
(T. 189) He contacted the Plaintiff and offered to buy out 
Plaintiff's interest in accordance with the provisions of 
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paragraph 8 of their agreement. Mr. Sather reifused. Mr. 
Pitcher thenf on December 31, 1978, terminated the 
partnership. (T. 55) The partnership at that time had 
inventory of approximately $13,000.00 and some equipment 
that was so old that it had no value. (T. 190) 
In 1978, the last year which the partnership operated, 
it incurred a loss of $7,450.02. Because of the large loss, 
the business was unable to pay certain of its taxes. In 
1979, the Internal Revenue Service assessed those taxes and 
levied on both the Plaintiff's and Mr. Pitcher's personal 
accounts. Plaintiff was required to pay $1,993.18 and Mr. 
Pitcher was required to pay $2,506.89. (T. 183) Mr. Pitcher 
also paid to the State Tax Commission the sum of $446.17. 
(P. 182, Exhibit 34) 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the Court concluded 
that little credibility could be given to the Plaintiff's 
conflicting testimony. Based on the evidence presented, the 
Court found that the assets of the partnership on the date 
it terminated had a value of $13,000.00. The Court also 
found that during the term of the partnership, it had 
sustained losses totaling $12,000.00, and that Mr. Pitcher 
was entitled to $14,000.00 for the rental of his building 
for the six years it was used by the partnership. The Court 
further found that the Plaintiff owed to the partnership 
$6,600.79 for rental fees and $832.98 for repairs to the 
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base stations used by Sather Jewelry, which amounts 
Plaintiff had failed to pay in violation of the parties 
agreement. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1) The rules for Appellate review require that the 
evidence be viewed in a light most favorable to the finding 
of the trial court, that considerable deference be given to 
the finding of the Court and that the decision should only 
be reversed to prevent manifest injustice. The Plaintiff 
acknowledges this standard for review, but then ignores it 
in his argument. The Plaintiff's claims of error relate to 
the Court's findings of fact and its calculations. In his 
argument, Plaintiff relies only on the portions of the 
record that add support to his argument. When the entire 
record is considered, the evidence fully supports the 
decision of the trial court. 
2) Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires that laches, an affirmative defense, be raised in 
the pleadings or it is waived. A party who is relying on an 
affirmative defense also has the burden to prove his 
defense. The Plaintiff never raised the defense of laches 
until his closing argument and produced no facts to support 
such a defense. The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to allow Plaintiff to raise the 
defense in his closing argument. 
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ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WHEN CONSIDERED IN FULL, SUPPORTS THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS. 
The burden of proof at trial was on the Plaintiff to 
prove facts in support of his Complaint. When the Plaintiff 
failed to produce any facts to support his claims, he cannot 
now be heard to complain about the trial court's findings 
adverse to him. A reviewing court will only consider the 
evidence presented to the trial court. Turtle Management, 
Inc. vs. Haggis Management, Inc. 645 P.2d 667 (Utah 1982). 
In reviewing this decision this Court should review the 
facts in a light most favorable to the findings of the trial 
court and should give considerable deference to the trial 
court's findings. West vs. West, 403 P.2d 22 (Utah 1965), 
Jeppsen vs. Jeppsen, 684 P.2d 69 (Utah 1984) The trial 
court's decision should only be reversed so as to prevent 
manifest injustice. Penrose vs. Penrose 656 P.2d 1017 (Utah 
1982) Tn evaluating the trial court's findings, the 
reviewing court should consider the written findings 
together with any oral statements made by the Court. Bill 
Nays & Sons Excavating vs. Neeley Construction Company, 677 
P.2d 1120 (Utah 1984) . 
The Plaintiff in his Brief has agreed with the above 
described standard of review. Yet the Plaintiff in his 
argument cites only a portion of the evidence, those that 
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support his argument, while completely disregarding the 
evidence that supports the Court's findings. In this 
particular case, the Court made a specific finding that the 
testimony of the Plaintiff and certain of his witnesses was 
not believable. On appeal Plaintiff challenges the facts 
that support the findings. In this case, there are 
substantial facts that support all the Court's findings, 
which Plaintiff attempts to ignore. When the facts that 
support the findings of the trial court are considered, 
those facts fully support the decision of the trial court, 
which decision should be affirmed. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT BASED ITS DECISION AS TO THE VALUE 
OF TOE ASSETS OF THE PARTNERSHIP ON THE 
UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE IN THE CASE. 
The Plaintiff in his first argument claims that the 
Court failed to value the partnership assets at their market 
value as of the time the partnership dissolved. Plaintiff, 
in making that argument, totally ignores the fact that he 
had the burden to prove the value of the assets and that he 
failed to produce any evidence on that point. The only 
evidence received on that issue was evidence from the 
Defendant who testified as to the fair market value of the 
assets as of the time the partnership dissolved. The court 
properly based its findings on the evidence received at 
trial. 
Since Plaintiff had no evidence on the issue, the 
reviewing court should not consider it an issue on appeal. 
Turtle Management Inc., vs. Haggis Management Inc., 6 45 P.2d 
667 (Utah 1982) If the Court does review the matter, it 
reviews the facts in a light most favorable to the 
prevailing party and the decision reached by the Court. 
Scharf vs. BMG Corporation, 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985) 
The only evidence regarding the value of the 
partnership assets at the time of dissolution, was presented 
by the Defendant. The only asset in the partnership was 
inventory, upon which the Defendant placed a fair market 
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value of $13,000.00, and some very old equipment, which 
Defendant said had no value. (T. 19 0) Neither party made a 
claim for good will and no evidence was presented regarding 
whether the company had good will or its value. 
The Court's findings on the value of the partnership as 
of the date of termination, are fully supported by the only 
evidence that was presented on that issue. The Plaintiff 
presented no evidence on either the value of the equipment 
and inventory, nor of his belated claim of good will. Since 
the evidence is fully supported, the decision should be 
affirmed. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CALCULATING THE 
AMOUN?L OF RENT OWED DEFENDANT FOR THE USE OF HIS 
BUILDING. 
Plaintiff argues that the Court improperly calculated 
the amount of rent due Defendant, arguing that the 
partnership occupied Plaintiff's building from January 1, 
1973, throuqh December 31f 1978. Those dates are based on a 
statement of the Defendant's. (T. 31 line 10) That 
statement was either a misstatement by the Defendant, or an 
error in transcription. All the other evidence shows that 
the Plaintiff's building was occupied by the partnership 
from December of 1972 through December of 1978. At trial, 
those dates were undisputed and were relied on by Plaintiff 
and his counsel. At no time did Plaintiff or his counsel 
claim that the dates were incorrect or the amount owed for 
rent was incorrect. (T. 30 lines 19-25; T. 110 lines 1-5, T. 
124 lines 6-13) 
The preponderance of the testimony was that the 
partnership moved into Plaintiff's building in December of 
1972. It remained there until the partnership terminated in 
December of 1978. The testimony further showed that a 
reasonable rental for that time period was $200.00 per 
month. The partnership occupied the building for 
approximately 72 months, which at $200.00 per month fully 
supports the $14,000.00 awarded by the trial court. (T. 195) 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION AS TO THE PROPER 
AMOUNT OF DAMAGES TO COMPENSATE DEFENDANT FOR HIS 
LOSS IS FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND IS 
PROPERLY CALCULATED. 
The trial court found that the Plaintiff was to be 
responsible for one-half of the losses and debts of the 
partnership, which included operating expenses, tax 
liabilities and interest. (Finding of Fact No. 9) The Court 
found the total loss to be $12,000.00, and entered Judgment 
for one-half of that amount as reimbursement to the 
Defendant. The Plaintiff argues that the Court 
miscalculated the amount of the loss. In making that 
argument, Plaintiff again overlooks the facts that support 
the Court's verdict and leaves out of his calculations many 
of the elements relied on by the Court in reaching its 
verdict. If the Court made a miscalculation, that 
miscalculation was in favor of the Plaintiff. 
The evidence at trial showed that the partnership had 
incurred an operating loss of $9,888.08, and it had unpaid 
taxes upon dissolution of $4,946.24, for a total of 
$14,834.32. Mr. Pitcher had paid the entire operating loss 
and paid, pursuant to a levy, $2,506.89 in federal taxes and 
$446.17 in state taxes. (T. 182-183) The Plaintiff, 
pursuant to a levy, had paid $1,993.18 in taxes. If the 
entire loss and debts of the partnership of $14,834.32 is 
divided in half, then each partner's share was $7,417.16. 
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Plaintiff had only paid $1,993.18, pursuant to a levy, of 
his share of the debts and losses. That left a balance 
owing from the Plaintiff to the Defendant of $5,423.98. 
The Court's finding further provided that the $6,000.00 
award included interest. The amount owed by Plaintiff to 
Defendant had been owing in excess of five years. If we 
consider the $5,423.98 for only five years at the statutory 
rate of interest of L0%, the total interest owing is 
$2,712.00. That amount added to the $5,423.98, brings a 
total of $R,135.98, which should be paid by Plaintiff to the 
Defendant. Therefore, the rulinq of the Court that 
Plaintiff was to pay to Defendant $6,000.00 was in favor of 
the Plaintiff and he should not complain at this time. 
12 
POINT V 
THE DEFENSE OF LACHES WAS PROPERLY REJECTED BY THE 
COURT BECAUSE IT WAS NOT PLED, NOR WAS THERE 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT. 
The defense of laches is an affirmative defense, which 
must be raised in the pleadings. Rule 8(c) Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Failure to raise the defense in the 
pleadings generally results in its exclusion as an issue in 
the case. FMA Financial Corporation vs. Build, Inc., 404 
P.2d 670 (Utah 1965) If a person has properly pled the 
defense of laches, he still has the burden to prove the 
defense. The defense of laches is contingent upon two 
elements, the first being lack of diligence on the opposing 
party in raising the claim, and the second being injury to 
the other party due to the lack of diligence. Leaver vs. 
Grose, 610 P.2d 1262 (Utah 1980) Mere delay is not 
sufficient, but it must be shown to work to the disadvantage 
of another. Papaniklos Brothers Enterprises vs. Sugarhouse 
Shopping Center Association, 535 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1975) The 
defense of laches is related to the statute of limitations 
and strong circumstances must exist to sustain a defense of 
laches when the statute of limitations has not run. Laniger 
vs Arden, 409 P.2d 891 (Nev. 1966) 
Plaintiff filed his Complaint in August of 1981. The 
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claims generally arose out of a partnership, dissolution of 
which occurred December 31, 1978. When Mr. Pitcher filed 
his Answer and Counterclaim, one of the defenses raised by 
Mr. Pitcher was the defense of laches. Plaintiff filed a 
response to the Counterclaim. Plaintiff, however, did not 
raise any affirmative defenses, including the defense of 
laches. The Plaintiff at no time raised the defense of 
laches until closing argument by his counsel. The trial 
court refused to allow him to raise that affirmative defense 
at that late date. (T. 212). This holding by the trial 
court was in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure 
and within the discretion given to the trial court. 
In addition to not raising the defense as is required 
by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the Plaintiff also failed 
to produce any facts to support his belated claim of laches. 
The facts at trial showed that if there was any lack of 
diligence, that lack of diligence was by the Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff knew of the termination of the partnership in 
January of 1979, but did not seek an accounting until August 
of 1981. Once the lawsuit was filed, the Plaintiff failed 
to take any action to move the case along, but rather by his 
actions delayed it for several years. The Plaintiff failed 
to respond to discovery despite orders of the Court, and 
requested several continuances because of problems with his 
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accountant. The Plaintiff also failed to produce any facts 
showing that he incurred any injury as a result of the 
delays. The Plaintiff failed to produce any facts at the 
trial that would support his claim of laches. Therefore, 
the Court's refusal to allow him to raise the affirmative 
defense at the closing arguments was proper and should be 
affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts presented at trial fully support the findings 
and verdict of the trial court. Defendant respectfully 
requests that the Court uphold the finding of the trial 
court. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this j2l day of May, 1986. 
NIELSEN ^SENIOR 
Attorneys//ftpr /$*e#pondent 
By: 
Clkrlc B. Allfed 
By: Att^OC^Ju^^ 
Gayle A. McKeachnie 
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ADDENDUM 
A G 1 K 5 M * M r 
This Agreement, made and entered into this s^n T~ day of /.-/,i*<£-' ***-'«-
/<^,7iT by and between R. R. SATHER, hereinafter called "Sather", and 
WILLIAM S. PITCHER, Jr., hereinafter called "Pitcher", 
W I T N E S S E T H ! 
1. That the parties hereto agree to enter into the business of 
Television and Electronic repairs and service, and Gather agrees as follows: 
a. To furnish shop from which the business is to be conducted. 
b. To furnish neceaaary equipment, to operate the business, including 
test equipment, and other equipment reasonably necessary to 
conduct the same, and to provide for and furnish an inventory 
of tubes, parts ^nd other materials that may be required In 
the business. 
2. That Pitcher agrees to spend his full time and effort in the 
said business and to whatever he can to secure business and to operate the 
business in a good and workmanlike manner. 
3. That It Is agreed that the business shall be owned by Sather, 
that Pitcher is to be compensated for his services ss follows: 
a. To receive 4o7. of all of the labor and 20* of ail of the 
parts and materials used in connection with radio and television 
repairs and service. 
b. To receive 60Z of the labor and 107* of all parts and materials 
used In the service and operation of the Communications part of 
the business. 
4. That Sather shalalfurniah a suitable service truck for use in 
the said business, it is agreed that time for the service truck, while on 
business purposes shall be billed to customers at the rate of .35c per mile, 
with Pitcher to receive the sum of .15c per mile, and the sum of .20 cents 
per mile to go for truck expenses and maintenance. 
5. That in the event that Pitcher does repair and service work 
for lather In connection with Sather Jewely Company, then such work shall be 
billed to Sather at the regular shop and service call rates. 
6. Ihat it is agreed that at least monthly, an accounting shall 
be had, both as to labor and for parts. 
7. That it is hereby sgreed that Pitcher will pay his own 
social security, income tax, and workmans compensation, and that Sather shall 
not be responsible for the same. 
- 1 -
8. That it it agreed that thltteegreement may be terminated by 
either of the part lea at any time, that upon termination It la agreed that 
an accounting in full ihall be had between the partial within three (4) daya 
after euch termination. 
9. That all of the Mlla, invoicing and "paper work" in connection 
with the buelneee ahall be the responsibility of Pitcher. 
WITNESS the handi of the part lea hereto thia day of 
. . 1972. 
9, 
R. R. Sather 
William B. Pitcher, Jr. 
- 2 -
8. That the said Pitcher shall have the option during the term 
of this agreement to purchase the entire business, the purchase price shall 
be determined on the basis of the cost of equipment, less depreciation, 
plus all of the inventory of parts, tubes, supplies, etc. 
9. That it is agreed that all of the expenses of the business, 
rent, utilities, taxes and other necessary business expenses shall be 
deducted before a division is made of the proceeds as set forth in paragraph 
3, hereof. 
10. That work done for Sather Jewelry, set forth In paragraph 5, 
hereof, all parts and materials used shall be at wholesale coat of the same* 
11. That it is sgreed that this agreement may be terminated by 
either of the parties at any time, that upon termination it ia agreed that 
an accounting in full shall be had between the parties within three (3) 
days after such termination. 
12. That all of the bills, invoicing and "paper work" in connection 
with the buslnes shall be the responsibility of Pitcher. 
WITNESS the hands of the partiee hereto this day of 
, 1972. 
a. R. Sather 
WITNESS: 
William E. Pitcher, Jr. 
TYPED REPRODUCTION OF HANDWRITTEN NOTES APPEARING 
ON BACK OF PAGE 3 OF EXHIBIT 2. 
"Purchase option" buy (blue ink) 
Business expenses to be taken off the top at 50-50, rent and 
utilities and taxes of profits before draw (blue ink) 
Change 3 to partnership (black ink) 
Store services charge parts only at wholesale cost (blue 
ink) 
Okay on agreement as listed above and front two pages 
ss/ R. R. Sather (blue ink) 
William Pitcher 7-1-72 (black ink) 
CLARK 3. ALLRED 
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Defendants 
363 East Main Street 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: (801) 789-4908 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
R.R. 3ATHER and R.R. SATHER 
dba SATHERS COMMUNICATIONS ) FINDINGS OF FACT 
ELECTRONICS and COMMUNICATIONS ) AND 
ELECTRONICS, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. ) 
WILLIAM E. PITCHER, JR., ) 
PITCHER COMMUNICATION ) 
ELECTRONICS, a corporation, ) 
DWIGHT PITCHER, VERNA PITCHER ) 
and JOHN DOES ONE and TWO, ) 
Defendants. ) Civil No. 11,156 
The above captioned matter came before the Court for trial 
on September 16, 1985, at 9:30 a.m. Plaintiff, R.R. Sather, was 
present and represented by his attorney, Anthony Famulary. 
Defendant, William E. Pitcher, Jr., was present and represented 
by his attorney, Clark B. Allred. The other Defendants have 
filed bankruptcy and notice of the bankruptcy filing is contained 
within the file. Testimony from various witnesses, together with 
documentary evidence was received by the Court and the Court 
being fully advised and having heard the testimony and examined 
the evidence produced and after argument by counsel hereby enters 
FILED 
DISTRICT COURT 
OCT 3 1255 
J U ^ u i n T L U V , A . 
_ > " " k f N 
the following Findings of Fact. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff, R.R. Sather, and Defendant, William E. 
Pitcher, Jr., entered into an agreement dated January 1, 1972. 
The agreement is Exhibit No. 2. 
2. One of the major issues before the Court is whether the 
agreement created a partnership as claimed by the Defendant or 
was a sole proprietorship arrangement as claimed by the 
Plaintiff. 
3. A determination of the issues in this case is primarily 
dependent upon the creditability of the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant. Based on the demeanor of the Plaintiff, the 
inconsistent statements, the responses given on the witness stand 
and the positions taken by the Plaintiff, the Court finds that 
little creditability should be given to the Plaintiff's 
testimony. 
4. The agreement of the parties, together with the actions 
of the parties, are more consistent with the arrangement being a 
partnership rather than a sole proprietorship. The Court finds 
that the facts are more consistent with the arrangement being a 
partnership. Those facts include the preparing and signing of a 
written agreement which is unusual in an employer/employee 
relationship, a requirement that the Defendant provide an 
accounting, the provision for a buy-out by the Defendant, 
Plaintiff's response to Defendant's proposed buy-out, the 
2 
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discussion regarding survivorship insurance, the fact that 
Defendant was responsible for the work and the inconsistent 
statements of the Plaintiff regarding what the arrangement was 
together with express language contained on the back of Exhibit 
2. 
5. The Court received testimony regarding an accounting 
provided by the Plaintiff and an accounting provided by the 
Defendant. The Court finds that the accounting provided by the 
Plaintiff can be given very little weight in that it was 
undisputed that not ail documents had been examined by the 
accountant, cash disbursements for expenses were not included and 
the records relied on by Plaintiff's accountant had not been in 
the possession of the accountant, but for three years had been in 
the possession of an accounting firm in California with no 
explanation given as to whether any documents had been removed, 
lost, changed or altered. 
6. The Plaintiff breached the terms of the parties 
agreement dated January 1, 1972, by his failure to provide a 
shop, to pay for personal repair and service work or to provide a 
truck or other equipment. In general the Plaintiff basically 
ignored the terms of the parties agreement. 
7. Defendant generally complied with the terms of the 
agreement until December 31, 1978, at which time he terminated 
the agreement by starting a new business entity. 
8. When Defendant terminated the business on December 31, 
3 
1978, Plaintiff was entitled to receive one-half of the value of 
the assets at that time. The assets of the partnership on 
December 31, 1978, included equipment which was fully depreciated 
and had no value and inventory of approximately $13,000.00. 
9. At the time the partnership was terminated on December 
31, 1978, Plaintiff was also responsible for one-half of the 
losses and debts of the partnership which losses included 
operating expenses during the term of the partnership, tax 
liabilities, tax benefits received by the Plaintiff and not by 
the Defendant and interest for a total loss of at least 
$12,000.00. 
10. Plaintiff, pursuant to the parties agreement, was 
responsible to provide a building for use of the partnership. 
The Plaintiff failed to provide that building and so the 
Defendant was required to provide the building. A reasonable 
rent for the building was $200.00 per month for a total rental of 
$14,000.00. 
11. Plaintiff used, during the term of the partnership and 
even after the partnership was terminated, two base stations 
which belong to the partnership. Plaintiff had agreed to pay a 
reasonable rental for those base stations, but failed to do so. 
A reasonable rental for those base stations during the time 
period they were in the Plaintiff's possession was $6,600.79. 
12. Plaintiff had agreed to pay the partnership for any 
repairs made to equipment owned by the Plaintiff. Plaintiff 
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incurred repair expenses of $832.98 which he has failed to pay. 
13. The Plaintiff treated the arrangement between the 
parties as a means whereby he could claim substantial tax 
benefits without incurring any work or expense and requiring the 
Defendant to do all the work and incur the expense which is 
contrary to the terms of the party's agreement. 
14. In August, 1981, Plaintiff signed an Affidavit and 
Judge Bullock, relying on the Affidavit, issued a Pre-judgment 
Writ of Replevin and an Order to Show Cause requiring the 
Defendant to appear before the Court on August 24, 1981. The 
Plaintiff, when signing the Affidavit under oath, had no facts 
which showed immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage and 
there was no basis for the issuance of the Pre-judgment Writ 
without notice to the Defendant. 
15. Defendant, on being served with the Pre-judgment Writ 
of Replevin and the Order to Show Cause, appeared before the 
Court on August 24, 1981. Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel 
appeared at that time and therefore the Writ was dismissed. 
16. In September, 1981, the Plaintiff signed an identical 
Affidavit and presented the same to a different Judge, Judge Sam, 
to obtain another Pre-judgment Writ of Replevin. No notice was 
given to the Defendant or his counsel of the Writ. The Plaintiff 
had no facts to support his claim of immediate and irreparable 
injury. 
17. Pursuant to the Order to Show Cause which accompanied 
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the second Writ of Replevin, the Defendant again appeared before 
the Court and the Court found at that time that venue was 
improper and ordered the case transferred to Uintah County, Utah. 
18. Defendant, to avoid other continued legal hassels, 
agreed to file a bond guaranteeing that the two base stations 
would be available in the event the Court ruled that Plaintiff 
was entitled to the same, 
19. Defendant incurred legal fees in the amount of $480.00 
contesting the two Writs of Replevin. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Rased on the preceding Findings of Factf the Court makes the 
following Conclusions of Laws. 
1. Plaintiff, R.R. Sather, and Defendant, William E. 
Pitcher, Jr., entered into a partnership whereby they were to 
split expenses, profits and losses 50-50. That partnership had a 
term beginning January 1, 1972 and terminated on December 31, 
1978. 
2. The testimony of Plaintiff, Sather, is to be given 
little credence. 
3. The accounting provided by Plaintiff, Sather, is to be 
given little credence. 
4. The accounting of the partnership shows that the 
Plaintiff owes to Defendant the sum of $6000.00 as his 50% share 
of the loss of the business and $10,716.88 for Plaintifffs 50% 
share for the rent of the building, the base stations and repairs 
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which Plaintiff had failed to pay to the partnership. 
5. Defendant owes to Plaintiff the sum of $6,500.00 for 
Plaintifffs 50% share of the assets of the partnership. 
6. The obtaining of the two Pre-judgment Writs of Replevin 
by the Plaintiff was in violation of Rule 64A of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, was done intentionally without notice and 
with malice and Defendant incurred damages of $480.00 in legal 
fees as a result of the wrongful actions of the Plaintiff. 
7. When amounts owed by the Defendant to Plaintiff is 
deducted from the amount owed by Plaintiff to Defendant, the 
resulting balance that Plaintiff owes to Defendant is the sum of 
$10,696.88 for which Defendant is entitled to judgment:. 
DATED this y day of Suu LJUUJLIL1 ,^  19 85 . ,« / 
Richard C. Davidson 
District Judge 
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CLARK B. ALLRED 
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for defendants 
363 East Main Street 
Vernal, Utah 84 0 73 
Telephone: (801) 789-4908 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
R.R. SATHER and R.R. SATHER 
dba SATHERS COMMUNICATIONS 
ELECTRONICS and COMMUNICATIONS 
V-r U r m D A M T f O 
*-* J-14-1 \* J. X \ W 1 1 ^ . >»* LJ f 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
W^.-JXJZAM E. PITCHER, JR. , 
PITCHER COMMUNICATION 
ELECTRONICS, a corporation, 
DWIGHT PITCHER, VERNA PITCHER 
and JOHN DOES ONE and TWO, 
Defendants. 
The above captioned matter having come before the Court on 
September 16, 1985, for trial and the Court having entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and being fully advised, 
hereby; 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that: 
1. Defendant, William E. Pitcher, Jr., have judgment 
against Plaintiff, R.R. Sather, in the amount of 510,696.88, 
together with costs. 
2. The undertaking previously filed herein on behalf of the 
JUDGMENT 
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Defendant regarding the base stations is hereby discharged, 
DATED this 7 day of-£££tekb/r, 1985.i 
•1 JL*.'*-*^*/ 1 
Richard C. Davidson 
District Judge 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and 
correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent -
William E. Pitcher, Jr., to Craig S. Cook, 3645 East 
3100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84109-, ffa this X") day 
of May, 1986. 
